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Regulatory Conflicts: International
Tender and Exchange Offers
in the 1990s
John C. Maguire*
I. INTRODUCTION
The beginning of the final decade of this century has seen tremen-
dous changes not only in terms of the world political environment,
but also in the developing international environment in which the
U.S. capital markets operate.
For the past several years, the term "internationalization of the se-
curities markets" has probably been one of the most publicized and
discussed financial trends in the United States. During this time the
internationalization of the securities markets have been driven by a
number of factors. For instance, corporations sought to enter mar-
kets outside their state of incorporation or home country to compete
in a global marketplace, to increase market share, revenues and prof-
its. The most important factor, technological advances, has also pro-
vided a major thrust towards internationalization.' With
technological advances, corporations have sought to increase their
presence in foreign markets, and investors, whether individuals or in-
stitutions, have become acutely aware of and interested in acquiring
the securities of the most profitable enterprises in order to diversify
their own portfolio investments.
* Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. (1988); LL.M in Securities Regula-
tion (1991), Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank David
Sirignano and Joseph Price for their help and insightful comments on an earlier draft
of this article. I also would like to thank Patti, Patrick and Colin for their patience
and understanding. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employ-
ees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the
Commission.
1. Morck and Yeung, Why Investors Value Multinationality, 64 J. OF Bus. 165
(1991).
In many respects, the issues raised by the internationalization of
the world's securities markets are the same for every market, regard-
less of size, complexity or volume. A markets supervisory, oversight
and enforcement regulations, clearance and settlement systems, capi-
tal standards, and most important for purposes of this article, disclo-
sure and financial reporting requirements should be fundamental
aspects of every market. Although the standards for governing these
elementary requirements arise in different contexts, both established
and emerging markets face many of the same questions: What trad-
ing, clearance and settlement systems and reporting requirements
will work most efficiently on a national and international founda-
tion? What information should a bidder or issuer be required to dis-
close? What are the common prerequisites that must exist in order
to facilitate international transactions, i.e., tender and exchange of-
fers between issuers of different countries?
Both established and emerging markets also face broader questions
as well. The most important question for our purposes, though, is:
How much or how little governmental regulation is appropriate or
politically feasible with respect to the facilitation of international
tender and exchange offers.
In their quest for world dominance, corporations have used tender
offers, whether friendly or hostile, as the predominant method for
acquiring control of a corporation.2 Since the financial stakes in an
acquisition or takeover can be extremely high, the motivation to cul-
tivate sophisticated offensive or defensive strategies becomes increas-
ingly important. Such strategies may involve corporations
attempting to increase their ability to control the outcome of an ac-
quisition within the framework of applicable regulation.3 One such
defense that may be utilized in the future is a target company at-
tempting to exploit its international shareholder base to defend
against a hostile offer by invoking the takeover rules and regulations
of more than one jurisdiction.
This article first briefly surveys the development of the interna-
tional shareholder base of target corporations, the increased acquisi-
tions and takeovers by foreign corporations in the United States and
elsewhere, and the exclusion of U.S. securityholders from many of
these international transactions in order to avoid what is perceived as
the most burdensome regulator. It then describes the United States
2. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1864
(1989) (cash premium made to securityholders is the most efficient manner of acquir-
ing a target company's shares, and proxy contests can also be used as a method of ac-
quiring securities, but it is rarely used in the United States). But cf. Gavin, Proxy
Contests Emerge, Supplant Tender Offers in Seeking Corporate Change, 204 N.Y.L.J. 7
(October 9, 1990).
3. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.01 (1991).
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Securities and Exchange Commission's (the "Commission's") experi-
ence in attempting to facilitate the inclusion of U.S. securityholders
in these international transactions. Included, is an analysis of the
rules and regulations relating to such transactions by using the
United States' Williams Act 4 and the United Kingdom's City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers (the "City Code"). 5
Similar to the United States, foreign countries are now addressing
the fundamental questions of whether and how to control the various
interests involved in a transaction for control of a corporation. 6 His-
torically, most corporate control transactions of publicly held compa-
nies occurred in the United States and the United Kingdom,
essentially as the result of their highly sophisticated and well-devel-
oped capital markets which can provide a purchaser with the source
of funds necessary to institute and complete a takeover.7 In addition,
these countries have no significant constraints or barriers on the
transfer of wealth.8
A. Background
The last decade, more than any other time in the world's economic
and financial history, has seen an explosive and dramatic growth in
the internationalization of the world's securities markets. Securities
markets around the world have become increasingly global as foreign
issuers expand their use of the U.S. capital markets, domestic issuers
increase their access to foreign markets, and tender and exchange of-
4. The Securities-Corporate Equity Ownership-Disclosure (Williams) Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and
78n(d)-(f) (1970)) (enacted in 1968 and amended in 1970, added sections 13(d), 13(e),
14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
5. THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (1990) 2 Fin. Serv. Rep. (CCH
Ltd).
6. See Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law concerning
takeovers and other general bids, 22 December 1988 (adoption by the EC Commission
19 January 1989), COM (88) 823 final-SYN 186 (Feb. 16, 1989), 14 O.J. Eur. Comm.
(1989); Amended Proposal of 10 September 1990, COM (90) 416 final-SYN 186, 26 O.J.
Eur. Comm. (1990) [hereinafter EC Proposal].
7. See 3C H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 15.05
(rev. 1989) (comparing the activity and size of various worldwide national markets).
8. Id.; see also Basaldua, Towards the Harmonization of EC Member States' Regu-
lations on Takeover Bids: The Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Com-
pany Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 492 (1989) (discussing the significant number
of takeovers that occur in the United Kingdom as a result of the open and developed
nature of their capital markets); Merril Stevenson, The Shot Heard Round Europe,
THE ECONoMIsT, Dec. 16, 1989 (In the Balance: A Survey of Europe's Capital Markets)
at 10, col. 1 (revealing that the United Kingdom's capital markets are preeminent in
Europe).
fers are made internationally. While at one time it was possible to
discuss the U.S. capital markets from a predominately domestic van-
tage point, this really is no longer possible. And although the U.S.
financial community would like to believe that the U.S. capital mar-
kets remain the largest, fairest and most innovative in the world, we
must now recognize the driving force of international trends in the
financial industry. For example, in FY 1990, 33 tender offers worth
approximately $18 billion were commenced by foreign bidders in the
United States9 for securities of issuers registered with the Commis-
sion under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act"). 1° U.S. investors purchased $130.9 billion in foreign equities in
1990, a more than ten-fold increase over 1980.11 For the first nine
months of 1991, U.S. investors made total net purchases of $25.3 bil-
lion.12 This amount is nearly double the previous record of $13.1 bil-
lion set for all of 1989. With net purchases in the third quarter, U.S.
investors have extended their succession of adding to their overseas
equity holdings to 13 consecutive quarters.' 3 Aggregate holdings by
U.S. persons of overseas stocks rose 40% to almost $125 billion from
$89.4 billion at year end 1990.14
The prospect of a unified European market this year also has led to
a significant amount of multinational investing and acquisitions
within the European Community ("EC"). In 1991, EC companies
made $51.9 billion in acquisitions of other EC companies. In the past
a significant majority of this activity was focused on the United King-
dom, but other countries, such as France and Germany, have begun
to increase their cross-border purchases versus prior years. For ex-
ample, French companies in 1991 entered into 220 cross-border trans-
actions worth $12.5 billion.15
As noted earlier, advancements in computer capabilities and tele-
communications during the 1980's has permitted instantaneous inter-
national securities trading, made international securities markets
accessible to a greater number of investors, and increased interna-
tional trading volume and liquidity.16 Much of this liquidity in the
9. INTERNATIONAL TENDER AND EXCHANGE OFFERS, 56 Fed. Reg. 27582, 27583 n.
13 (1991) [hereinafter International Tender Offer Release].
10. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.).
11. See supra note 9, at 27583.
12. Michael R. Sesit, Americans' Purchases of Foreign Stocks Soared in First 9
Months of 91, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1992, at c1l, col. 4. (Net purchases is defined as total
purchases minus total sales.)
13. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1992, C11, col. 4.
14. Id.
15. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 13, 1992, A7A, col. 3.
16. See, e.g., Mann & Mari, Current Issues in International Securities Law En-
forcement, in A.B.A., THE SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE AND THE
SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW AND THE DIVISION FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION PRESENT
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United States during the 1980s was a result of foreign investment in
the U.S.
The Commission in the past has approached international regula-
tory issues by attempting to encourage and accommodate initiatives
by U.S. market participants and by working with foreign regulatory
counterparts, both on a bilateral basis and in various international fo-
rums. 17 As the Commission has participated in these cooperative ef-
forts with regulators from other countries, it has become increasingly
clear that the decisions regulators make for their own markets will
significantly affect other world markets.
The critical interests implicated for policy makers in dealing with
the internationalization of the world's securities markets has been
summarized by one securities expert as follows:
The growth in the number of international [securities] transactions has been
overwhelming .... Existing regulations, designed to maintain the integrity of
the national markets, are being stretched beyond their boundaries in an effort
to apply to the plethora of complex international securities transactions ....
This globalization of the securities markets only serves to magnify the need
for cooperation among securities regulators.1 8
B. The Nature of the Problem
With the globalization of the world's economies and securities mar-
kets, the potential for international fraud and illegal or criminal be-
havior is heightened. The enforcement of laws against international
insider trading has become a top priority in the United States. In
1988, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act of 1988,19 for the purpose of preventing the "ever-in-
creasing incidence of insider trading violations carried on through
off-shore entities." 20 One Congressional report went so far as to state
that, "[w]hen fraudulent trading from abroad is not comprehensively
investigated and prosecuted, the integrity of U.S. equity markets is
threatened, all investors are put at risk and a tougher standard of
prosecution for domestic traders is created." 2'
The Commission recognizes that conflicting regulation of interna-
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 51, 57 (1989); see also Sterngold, Redrawing
the Financial Map: US. Firms Look Abroad, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1986, at D1, col.3.
17. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
18. H. BLOOMENTHAL, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW 10-1 (1989 ed.).
19. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)).
20. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988).
21. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PROBLEMS WITH THE SEC'S EN-
tional tender and exchange offers is a significant and increasing prob-
lem.22 As noted above, as corporations become international in their
operations and marketing, their securityholder base in many in-
stances has also become international in stature. A result of the
globalization of the capital markets and the desire to expand into for-
eign markets is an increase in corporate acquisitions in order to ac-
complish the desired penetration into the foreign market. However,
by penetrating a foreign market in this manner, a corporation neces-
sarily implicates the laws of more than one country because of its in-
ternational shareholder base and the foreign domicile of the potential
target corporation.
At the core of the problem is the nature and degree of the legal
protection that should be afforded to securityholders in international
tender and exchange offers. For most of the 20th century, interna-
tional security regulation, in general, has been perceived by U.S. mar-
ket participants as offering a different and less desirable form of
protection due to a perceived lack of quality. While the United States
has favored regulation emphasizing rules governing the securities dis-
tribution, trading processes and disclosure,23 most other countries, es-
pecially those in Western Europe, endorsed rules regulating the
organization of corporations.2 4
Securities regulation by the various international regulatory au-
thorities in the 1990s and beyond, will turn on the answers to two sig-
nificant questions. First, how much and how quickly should the U.S.
regulatory system change in response to the significant cross-border
capital movements and the economic integration going on throughout
the world. And second, with regard to regulating international capi-
tal movements and international transactions such as tender and ex-
change offers, what should the appropriate legal standards be,
"national treatment," "reciprocity" or some other treatment.
FORCEMENT OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS IN CASES INVOLVING SUSPICIOUS TRADES
ORIGINATING FROM ABROAD, H.R. Rep. No. 1065, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
22. International Tender Offer Release, supra note 9; Concept Release on Multina-
tional Tender and Exchange Offers, 55 Fed. Reg. 23751 (June 12, 1990); See also, Mul-
tijurisdictional Disclosure and Mod iications to the Current Registration and
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 (July 1, 1991) [MJDS
Adopting Release]; Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current
Registration and Reporting System for Canada, 55 Fed. Reg. 46288 (November 2, 1990)
[MJDS Reproposal]; and Multijurisdictional Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. 32226 (August 4,
1989) [MJDS Original Proposal].
23. Comment, Does The European Community Have A Fatal Attraction For Hos-
tile Takeovers? A Comparison Of The European Commission's Proposed Directive On
Takeover Bids And The United States Experience, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663 (1990).
24. Id. But cf. 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) p.60125 (June 1989) (discussing direc-
tives that the EC community has implemented under Article 54 of the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty to regulate mergers and acquisitions).
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C. Extraterritoiality-Jurisdiction-The Williams Act
Securities regulation in the United States is conducted under laws
adopted in the early 1930s with only minor amendment since. Histor-
ically, the U.S. capital markets have been viewed as self-contained
and dominant, a view that today ignores reality. However, this his-
torical view fostered a belief that U.S. investors, where ever they
may be, need the protection afforded by the federal securities laws.
With this in mind, the starting point for any discussion on interna-
tional tender and exchange offers, is extraterritoriality and jurisdic-
tion of the federal securities laws.
The U.S. courts, and specifically the Commission, have frequently
been subject to criticism for their extraterritorial exercises of juris-
diction in the fields of antitrust, export controls, law enforcement,
and the federal securities laws.25 The extraterritorial application of
jurisdiction can escalate into serious diplomatic conflicts26 or pit a
U.S. agency, the Commission, against the international banking com-
munity and what was believed to be well-established international
banking law.27 In addition, the Commission and other regulatory au-
thorities who seek the extraterritorial assertion of its statutes will, it
is anticipated, in the future more frequently come into conflict with
other regulatory authorities around the world. As foreign countries
either adopt or revise their regulations governing tender and ex-
change offers, such conflicts will inevitably occur unless the various
regulatory authorities seek to implement cooperative regulation.
1. Jurisdiction Generally
The U.S. Supreme Court long ago determined that international
law applies to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States, partic-
25. Note, SEC v. Standard Chartered Bank.- Maintaining the Integrity of US. Cap-
ital Markets or Extraterritoriality Run Rampant?, 22 LAW AND POL'Y IN INT'L Bus.
159 (1991) [hereinafter Standard Chartered] (stating that the Commission's position on
the scope of the extraterritoriality of the federal securities laws in the context of this
case was insupportable under international law). See also, Small, Managing Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government Approach, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoBs. 283 (1987) (providing a broad overview of extraterritorial conflicts
and the U.S. Government's evolving attitudes towards extraterritoriality); Comment,
Extraterritorial Application of Securities Regulations: Territorialism in the Wake of
the October 1987 Market Crash, 1 .TRANSNAT'L. LAW. 307 (1988).
26. Small, supra note 25 at 285-286 (discussing the controversy that arose when
the United States broadened its sanctions in 1981 against the Soviet Union's Yamal
natural gas pipeline).
27. Standard Chartered, supra note 25 at 159.
ularly in matters affecting the interests of foreign countries. 28
The territorial principle of jurisdiction provides that a state has the
power to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce rules of law for conduct
that occurs within its own territory (the "conduct test") or for con-
duct which occurs outside its territory but has effects within the ter-
ritory (the "effects test").29 Personal jurisdiction of a state over a
foreign entity by reason of the entity's organization within that state,
on the other hand, does not necessarily give the state general juris-
diction over the worldwide actions or assets of that entity.30 Personal
jurisdiction, though, should be measured by its reasonableness in
light of various factors, such as the parties' "contacts and links" to
the forum court and their "justified expectations."3' Unless this was
the case, international corporations would be subject to potentially
multiple conflicting rules of law. However, the focus of this section is
on subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction is assumed.
2. Jurisdiction and the Application of the Williams Act
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act provide the initial basis
for subject matter jurisdiction. Although the statutes grant fairly
broad jurisdiction, they do not give specific authority to U. S. federal
courts to apply the federal securities laws to claims arising from ex-
traterritorial transactions. 32 Section 27 of the Exchange Act3 3 estab-
lishes exclusive jurisdiction over violations of that Act in the federal
courts. However, Section 27 states that the provisions of that Act and
the rules and regulations thereunder do not apply to any person who
transacts business in securities outside the jurisdiction of the United
States, unless the activity violates rules and regulations that have
28. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). It is well established that interna-
tional law is part of the law of the United States and that U.S. courts are bound to give
effect to international law. Id at 700.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITES
STATES §§ 402, 403, 421 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
30. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1957; Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 253 (1958); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297-98 (1980); Burger King Corp. V. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) and Asahi
Metal Ind. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). In personam jurisdiction
is a critical element that needs to be established in any litigation brought in the United
States, this article assumes that such standards would be met. The recent decision of
Asahi, contains a lengthy discussion of foreign corporate contact with the United
States relative to the stream of commerce standards used in establishing personal ju-
risdiction. An analysis of this particular issue might involve a myriad of problems as-
sociated with international offerings or activity associated with international trading
that is beyond the scope of this article.
.31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, at Introductory Note to Part IV, Ch.
1, subch. A.
32. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
promulgating the Securities Act, Congress granted United States District Courts juris-
diction over violations of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1933 as amended).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934 as amended).
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been enacted by the Commission to protect the integrity of market
regulations in general.
The apparent focus of Section 27 is to exempt foreign brokers,
dealers or investors who trade securities of U.S. based corporations
on foreign markets. In subsection (a) of the Section, the language is
clearly directed to transactions involving U.S. based issuers on for-
eign exchanges. Subsection (b) specifically provides an exemption to
such activity on foreign markets. A plain reading of the statute ap-
pears to support the inference that apprehension over foreign trans-
actions should be confined to those transactions that affect U.S.
investors.3 4 Therefore, in the absence of provisions that would ex-
tend the reach of Commission rules and regulations, U.S. courts have
consistently applied Section 30 of the Exchange Act as an exemption
of foreign activity from the United States jurisdiction. If Sections 27
and 30 of the Exchange Act preclude extraterritorial application, how
have U. S. courts found jurisdiction beyond the statutory language in
the context of international transactions?
With respect to the Williams Act, and for that matter the antifraud
concepts of the Exchange Act3 5 as applied to an international tender
offer, the Commission, itself, has stated that jurisdiction will depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each transaction.3 6 As noted
above, U. S. courts have found jurisdiction over extraterritorial con-
duct, in general, by using two standards: the "conduct" test, under
which jurisdiction is predicated on conduct occurring within the
United States; and the "effects" test, under which jurisdiction is
predicated upon acts causing significant and foreseeable effects
within the United States, regardless of where the conduct occurred.3 7
The U.S. courts have given a broad interpretation to the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the Exchange Act 38 in order "to protect domestic
investors who have purchased foreign securities on American ex-
changes and to protect the domestic securities market from the ef-
34. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32.
35. Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e)
(1988)] and rules and regulations thereunder.
36. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, Report of the Staff of the
US. Securities Exchange Commission to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, section VII-6 (July 27,
1987).
37. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.) cert.
dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.30 (1991); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (1988).
fects of improper foreign transactions in American Securities."39 The
Commission, however, has recognized that the jurisdictional reach of
the Williams Act is not unlimited and cannot require that a foreign
bidder extend its offer into the United States.40
In enacting the Williams Act,41 the U.S. Congress amended certain
discreet sections of the Exchange Act.42 In promulgating the Wil-
liams Act, Congress' main focus was to enable a target corporation's
shareholders sufficient time and adequate information about the of-
feror and the offeror's intentions so as to provide shareholders with
the ability to make an informed investment decision regarding the
bid.43
In adopting the Williams Act rules, the Commission has never
stated that the nationality of the target company or the bidder is de-
terminative of whether the Williams Act or the Commission's rules
and regulations are applicable to a particular foreign transaction.44
In fact, Sections 13(e) and 14(e) do not include provisions requiring
that the offer be conducted through the use of the jurisdictional
means. Such a broad interpretation of Sections 13(e) and 14(e)
should not necessarily permit those statutory provisions to reach
transactions that are overwhelmingly foreign in character. In princi-
ple, courts have generally stated that jurisdiction should not extend
beyond that reasonably contemplated by Congress. For instance, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,45 in the context of the extraterritorial
application of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, "it would
be... erroneous to assume that the legislature always means to go to
the full extent permitted" by a literal interpretation of the statute in
question.46
In the context of the Securities Act of 1933,4 7 the Commission has
declined to exercise its regulatory authority and jurisdiction since
1964 with respect to a securities distribution that "is to be effected in
39. Schoenbaum, supra note 37, at 206.
40. See S.10839, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Letter from SEC Chairman David S.
Ruder to Congressman Harold Rogers regarding Hoylake Investments, Ltd., a Ber-
muda company for B.A.T. Industries PLC, a British company). See also Amendments
to Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, 51 Fed. Reg. 25873 (1986).
41. The Williams Act, supra note 4.
42. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-((e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1968) (explaining that the
intention of the Williams Act amendments to the federal securities laws is to fill a reg-
ulatory "gap" in those laws) reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2812
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
44. Goelzer, Mills, Gresham & Sullivan, The Role of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission in Transnational Acquisitions, 3 TRANSNAT'L. LAw. 615 (1988)
[hereinafter Goelzer].
45. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. Id. at 1334.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1988).
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a manner abroad," even where the federal securities laws may have
been triggered by the use of the "jurisdictional means" (i.e., the offer
or sale of a security involving the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce or the U.S. mails).48 In light of this, the need for a cautious
interpretation of the scope of a statutory provision is particularly
true with respect to regulatory provisions such as those embodied in
the Williams Act and the Commission's rules governing tender of-
fers. In order to clarify the extraterritorial reach of its rules with re-
gard to the registration of securities, the Commission recently
adopted Regulation S under the Securities Act.49 In adopting Regula-
tion S, the Commission has taken a territorial approach to the en-
forcement of Section 5 of the Securities Act.50 The Commission in
adopting Regulation S established a non-exclusive safe harbor for the
offer, sale and resale of securities viewed as arising outside of the
United States, thereby viewing such offers, sales or resales as not be-
ing subject to the registration requirements of the United States.
However, it should be noted that the Commission in adopting the
regulation stated emphatically that this territorial approach to the re-
gistration of securities will not affect the broad reach of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.51
In this same context, the regulatory framework for the application
of the Williams Act to international tender and exchange offers,
which also were conceived primarily for domestic application, should
be understood in a fashion similar to the Commission's policy ex-
pressed in Regulation S. Consequently, when a foreign corporation
extends a tender offer for the shares of another foreign entity, the
applicability of the Williams Act should turn on the extent to which
the conduct in question occurs in or affects the United States or its
investors. Thus, a foreign bidder should be permitted to avoid the ap-
plication of the federal securities laws if, and only if, permitted by
48. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Under-
writers of Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealers, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964); (Securities
Act Release No. 4708 contained therein stated that the Commission would not take
any enforcement action for the failure to register securities of a U.S. corporation dis-
tributed abroad solely to foreign nationals, if the distribution is effected in a manner
that would result in the securities coming to rest abroad, even if the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce are implicated).
49. Offshore Offers and Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. 18306 (1990) [Regulation S Adopting
Release]; see also Offshore Offers and Sales, 54 Fed. Reg. 30063 (1989) [Regulation S
Reproposing Release] and Offshore Offers and Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 22661 (1988) [Regu-
lation S Proposing Release].
50. Regulation S Proposing Release, supra note 49, at 22662.
51. Id.
the home jurisdiction, by tailoring the terms of the transaction to
minimize its contacts with the United States.
II. FOREIGN RESPONSE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
Where the number of U.S. holders of the foreign target corpora-
tion's securities are not substantial, foreign bidder's have attempted
to avoid U.S. jurisdiction and the application of the federal securities
law by minimizing their conduct in the United States concerning the
offer by, for example, not mailing the offer into the United States,
and by utilizing depository and transfer agents located outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States. In IT v. Cornfeld, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that there is "no reason
to extend jurisdiction to cases where United States activities . . .are
relatively small in comparison to those abroad."5 2
When a foreign entity makes a tender offer for the shares of an-
other foreign entity, the application of the Williams Act should turn
on the extent to which the conduct in question occurs in or affects
the United States and its securityholders who hold the targeted
shares. A former General Counsel for the Commission has stated
that generally if a bidder, foreign or domestic, is careful to minimize
its contacts with the United States in making its offer, by among
other things, ensuring against distribution of tender offer material
into the United States, or acceptance of securities tendered from
within the United States, and by using depository and transfer agents
located outside the United States, the offer should not be subject to
the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts where U.S. securityholdings are in-
consequential.5 3 If this is true, then a domestic or foreign bidder
purchasing shares of a foreign corporation that is not registered with
the Commission, has few U.S. securityholders, and does not have se-
curities listed on a national securities exchange or quoted on an inter-
dealer quotation system, should not be concerned that the Williams
Act will apply unless Section 14(e) and/or other antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws are deemed to encompass the transac-
tion once the prescribed jurisdictional tests are met.54
In Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC,55 the district court
held that the Williams Act did not apply to an exchange offer by a
British company for the securities of another British company, even
though a class of the target corporation's securities were registered
with the Commission and traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
52. 619 F.2d at 920 (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d
Cir.)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
53. Goelzer, supra note 44, at 621.
54. Id.
55. 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986).
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In that offer, U.S. securityholders were expressly excluded from the
tender offer and the transaction was structured in such a manner as
to avoid the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws by prohibiting
the mailing of materials into the United States and by permitting
only the acceptance of shares tendered in envelopes postmarked from
outside the United States. In addition, the American press were spe-
cifically excluded from press conferences and were not provided cop-
ies of the press releases. The court found this factor significant, even
though the offer was immediately and widely reported in the U.S.
press. However, of particular significance to the court was the pre-
dominately foreign nature of the offer (i.e., only 1.6% of the target's
potential voting shares were held by U.S. residents).
Foreign purchasers conducting a tender offer for the shares of an-
other foreign corporation will often times provide foreign sharehold-
ers an election to receive either cash or securities of the acquiring
corporation. On the other hand, U.S. purchasers will often conduct a
cash tender offer for 51 percent of the outstanding shares to be fol-
lowed by a registered exchange offer for the remaining securities of
the target corporation, although cash elections are not uncommon.
Foreign purchasers, though, restrict U.S. securityholders to receiving
only cash, structuring the transaction in such a manner as to avoid
the necessity of filing a Securities Act registration statement in the
United States. Two questions arise when foreign purchasers attempt
to structure the transaction in such a manner: (1) whether the offer
to U.S. securityholders, even though limited to cash, constitutes an
"offer to sell" :securities within the meaning of Sections 2(3) and 5 of
the Securities Act;56 and (2) whether such a structure violates the
provisions of Rule 14d-10 or 13e-4(f)(8) of the Exchange Act.57 The
staff of the Division of Corporation Finance at the Commission has
previously stated that such a structure does not constitute an "offer
to sell."58 The staff's position appears predicated on the purchaser's
representation that certain disclosures are included in the offering
document sent to all securityholders to insure that the securities are
not offered to U.S. securityholders and adequate safeguards are im-
plemented to assure that no U.S. securityholders receive any of the
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3), 77(e) (1988).
57. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-10, 240.13e-4(f)(8) (1991). See also Amendments to Tender
Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, 51 Fed. Reg. 25873 (July 17, 1986) [hereinafter
All-Holders and Best-Price Release].
58. Alberta Energy Co. Ltd. [1982-1983] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77-335 (Feb. 23,
1983); Jamaica National Investment Company Ltd. (avail. November 29, 1979).
securities issued.5 9 Counsel for the purchaser has also been required
to represent that by taking the above safeguards, such a structure
does not constitute an "offer to sell." This raises the question of
whether such a structure violates the Commission's "All-Holders and
Best-Price" rules. Attempts to provide U.S. securityholders with an
alternative form of consideration are governed by these rules. The
Commission in adopting the "All-Holders and Best-Price" rules
stated that if sufficient conduct or effects occur in the United States,
subjecting the offer to the Williams Act, any conditions that exclude
shareholders in a particular country would violate the rules. On the
other hand, the Commission also stated that the rules were not "in-
tended to affect tender offers not otherwise subject to the Williams
Act" and which "do not employ the jurisdictional means of the
United States."60 The Commission has, however, considered requests
for exemptive relief from these provisions on a case-by-case basis,
and on occasion, based upon specific facts and circumstances, granted
exemptive relief.61
As a result, the application of the Williams Act to a tender offer
for a foreign target corporation depends upon the facts and circum-
stances of each transaction. 62 The Commission recognized and em-
59. Generally, those safeguards include (1) a legend in bold-face type on the cover
of the offering circular and any letters of transmittal that the securities are not offered
to U.S. holders and have not been registered under the Securities Act; (2) a different
letter of transmittal for the offer that is sent to the United States that allows only for
the receipt of the cash portion of the transaction; (3) a certification that a tendering
shareholder is a resident of the foreign country; (4) a direction to the depositary for
the offer not to mail or otherwise deliver the foreign securities into the United States;
and (5) a restrictive legend on the certificates that the securities many only be trans-
ferred to a resident of the foreign country. Alberta Energy Co. Ltd., supra note 58
(avail. July 19, 1982).
60. All-Holders and Best Price Release, supra note 57, at 25878.
61. See Alberta Energy Co. Ltd. [1989-19901 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,306
(March 21, 1990) (exemptive relief provided to allow U.S. securityholders of a Cana-
dian target corporation to receive only cash in an exchange offer by a Canadian pur-
chaser because of a Canadian law prohibiting foreign ownership of Canadian energy
companies); Freeport-McMoran Energy Partners, Ltd. (June 19, 1989) (exemptive re-
lief granted to allow Canadian securityholders of a U.S. target corporation to receive
only cash in an exchange offer by a U.S. purchaser due to a U.S. law prohibiting for-
eign ownership of domestic oil and gas leases); Varity Corp., First Marathon Sec. Ltd.
(July 19, 1991) (exemptive relief granted to a Canadian company, formed as a mutual
fund corporation under Canadian tax law, which intended to make an exchange offer
to certain Canadian resident securityholders of another Canadian company that was
redomiciling in the United States on a showing that participation by U.S. securi-
tyholders of the Canadian target company would be harmed by their participation in
the exchange offer); and Imperial Oil Ltd. [1989-1990] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,310
(Nov. 11, 1989) (exemptive relief denied to a Canadian purchaser that would have pre-
vented U.S. securityholders of a Canadian affiliate of a U.S. corporation from choosing
between alternate forms of consideration that were being offered the Canadian share-
holders when no claim was made by the Canadian purchaser that such ownership
would violate applicable Canadian law).
62. Goelzer, supra note 44, at 620-21.
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phatically stated that the "All Holders and Best-Price" rule,
requiring that tender offers must be made to all holders of the class
of securities subject to the offer and on identical terms, would not re-
quire bidders to make offers to U.S. residents.63 However, if the of-
fer employs the jurisdictional means, the rule requires that the offer
be made to U.S. residents on the same terms as other securityholders,
absent a grant of exemptive relief by the Commission.6 4 In addition,
the Commission continues to believe that notwithstanding the lack of
an affirmative act by a foreign bidder to invoke U.S. jurisdiction, "the
requisite use of jurisdictional means can be established... where it is
reasonably foreseeable that U.S. shareholders of a foreign issuer that
have been excluded from an offshore offer will sell their shares into
the market in response to that offer." 65 Such a view has raised con-
siderable concern from a number of commentators on the Commis-
sion's International Tender Offer Release and the Concept Release.
III. CONFLICTING REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL TENDER AND
EXCHANGE OFFERS
As the frequency of international tender and exchange offers esca-
late, the legal and regulatory issues related to such transactions are
becoming more complex. Purchasers that move beyond their na-
tional borders frequently find themselves in the position of being
subject to more than one regulatory scheme-for acquisitions, gener-
ally, as well as for transactions in regulated industries 66-that not
63. All-Holders and Best-Price Release, supra note 57, at 28577 (citing Plessey Co.
PLC v. General Elect. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986)).
64. See Rule 14d-10(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(e) (1991).
65. See Concept Release, supra note 22, at 23752 n.2, (citing Schmuck v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989)); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). See also
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
110 S. Ct. 29 (1989). Cf. Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elect. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477
(D. Del. 1986).
66. See Booth, The Problem With Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
707, 710-715 (1989) (discussing the significance of the Williams Act in relationship to
the federal regulatory structure for takeover controls); Brown, Regulatory Interven-
tion in the Market for Corporate Control, 23 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1989) (same);
Greenbaum, An American Perspective on the European Commission's "Amended Pro-
posals for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertak-
ings" and Its Impact on Hostile Tender Offers, 7 DICK. J. INT'L L. 195, 196-204 (1989)
(discussing Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and Williams Act as primary federal takeover regu-
lations). Congress also has enacted legislation that limits acquisitions by foreign offer-
ors of companies that may affect the "national security" of the United States. See
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat.
1107, 1425-26 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (1988)) (providing legislative restrictions on
tender offers by foreign parties, the Exon-Florio provisions); Regulations Pertaining to
only differ but contradict the requirements in the home country of
the target corporation. Complying with the tender offer regulation of
two or more countries that contradict each other can be especially
perplexing.
The means in which rules and regulations relating to acquisitions
can differ from one jurisdiction to another are almost as numerous as
the types of conduct regulated in acquisitions. 67 The international
purchaser of the 1990s invariably must walk a legal tightrope to sat-
isfy the contrasting demands of regulatory authorities. Some of the
more significant differences relate to: (i) the types of accumulations
of a target company's shares that must be made by way of a formal
offer or takeover bid; (ii) whether a compulsory acquisition is re-
quired (as is required in the United Kingdom and a number of other
countries, and under the proposed EC Directive on takeovers68 ); (iii)
whether the bidder is required to pay public shareholders the same
price it has paid other securityholders in acquiring a minority inter-
est in the target corporation (as is now required in a number of Euro-
pean countries); (iv) whether the use of securities as part or all of the
consideration offered will require the bidder to register securities in
the target corporation's country of incorporation (such as in the
United States); (v) whether there is a minimum offering period (now
required in most mature markets); (vi) whether all securityholders as
a class are permitted to participate in the transaction; (vii) whether
securityholders will be permitted to withdraw, and if so, when (the
U.K. City Code provides for withdrawal rights only if the offer fails
to go "unconditioned as to acceptances"); (viii) whether the bidder is
permitted to purchase shares during the tender or exchange offer or
whether such purchases are prohibited by regulation (such purchases
being prohibited in the United States69 ); (ix) whether a partial offer
is authorized or prohibited or authorized with a regulator's consent;
and (x) the type of financial disclosure that will be required in a dis-
closure document, if any. As the above list demonstrates, already
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 54 Fed. Reg. 29 (1989) (pro-
posing regulations to implement the Exon-Florio provisions). The Exon-Florio provi-
sions lapsed, but were re-authorized by the president. Defense Production Act
Extension and Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-99 (1991) (exempts section 721 of
the Defense Production Act, which incorporates the Exon-Florio provisions, from ter-
mination even if the Act were to lapse again). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1301(1), 1301(13),
1378(f) (regulating foreign ownership of air carriers); 14 U.S.C.§ 802(a) (regulating
coastal shipping); and 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (regulating foreign ownership of broadcasting
licenses).
67. See, e.g., SECTION ON BUSINESS LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION,
Constraints on Cross Border Takeovers and Mergers- A Catalogue of Disharmony, 19
INT'L Bus. LAW. 49 (Feb. 1991). See also INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS, supra note 36, §§ 111-246 - 111-297.
68. See City Code Rule 9.1 (1990], 2 Fin. Serv. Rep. (CCH Ltd.), F-1, at 140,481;
EC Proposal, supra note 6, art. 4, at 9-10.
69. See Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-13 (1991).
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complex problems may be compounded if the target has a substantial
number of shareholders that are citizens of other countries. More-
over, this problem can rankle corporations even when both the pur-
chaser and target corporations are incorporated in the same country,
simply as a result of the internationalization of the target corpora-
tion's share ownership.
A. Resolution of Conflicting Regulation-Alternative Approaches
When confronted with conflicting legal requirements, there appear
to be only a handful of procedures available for accomplishing the
transaction. For various reasons, no one procedure has provided pur-
chasers, target corporations and regulators sufficient comfort. Pres-
ently there have been four principal approaches taken by purchasers
in making an international tender or exchange offer.
1. Prevention of an Offer
One approach to the problem requires the bidder to abandon the
tender or exchange offer completely when faced with significant
legal conflicts in reconciling two or more sets of requirements. This
may occur if the bidder concludes that the regulatory authorities in
the target jurisdiction require full compliance with that regulatory
scheme and are unwilling to waive any of the conflicting require-
ments. This generally occurs when there are no alternatives to
avoiding the application of the laws of the second jurisdiction, if the
requirements of the bidder are diametrically opposed to the require-
ments of the target's jurisdiction, and if each of the other jurisdic-
tion's regulators are unwavering in their belief as to the applicability
of their regulations.
Such a resolution, however, is far from ideal for shareholders. This
solution prevents securityholders from considering an acquisition
that may be advantageous to them. Because tender offers are typi-
cally made at a substantial premium over the current market price
for a target corporation's stock, shareholders would prefer that a
takeover offer be presented to them. This kind of an approach by
regulatory authorities may cause corporations to become takeover
proof by "internationalizing their shareholder base." 70
70. Brown & MacLachlan, Legal Headaches for Buyers Going into Foreign Lands,
INT'L MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 57, 59 (March/April 1991).
2. Avoidance of the Conflicting Jurisdiction
Another approach by a bidder in an international tender or ex-
change offer is to resolve conflicting regulatory requirements by try-
ing to avoid the particularly burdensome requirements of one
jurisdiction. This may be accomplished by failing to meet those stan-
dards7 1 that are likely to bring the transaction within the confines of
the more oppressive regulatory scheme.72 In this approach, a bidder's
offer generally is not presented to shareholders who reside in the ju-
risdiction with the most difficult regulatory scheme. Such a disparate
result is problematic for securityholders of the target corporation in
the jurisdiction with the burdensome regulatory scheme, since these
securityholders will be forced to make difficult investment decisions
on whether to tender, hold or sell into the marketplace based upon
inadequate information and disclosure.
In the United States, a purchaser is required to make an offer to all
securityholders, 73 thereby rendering it impossible to avoid a jurisdic-
tional standard in another country. Moreover, minority acquisitions
or "squeeze-out" provisions may require that, before non-tendering
securityholders may be compulsorily acquired, the offer must be
made to all securityholders and a certain percentage of the outstand-
ing shares have been accepted in the tender offer.74 Not surprisingly,
U.S. regulation is considered the most onerous, and as a result, a pro-
71. Assuming personal jurisdiction, the United States generally requires that
there be an offer or sale of a security involving the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce or the United States mails. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, requires
that the target of a takeover offer or exchange offer be chartered in the United King-
dom or have its principal place of business in the United Kingdom. See City Code In-
troduction [1990], 2 Fin. Serv. Rep. (CCH Ltd.), A-7, at 140, 243.
72. Purchasers may seek to avoid the jurisdiction of one country even though it is
foreseeable that the takeover offer will affect the market price of the target corpora-
tion's stock as arbitrageurs purchase shares in the jurisdiction with the most stringent
regulatory scheme in order to sell into the jurisdiction in which the target corporation
resides. In so doing, shareholders are forced to make investment decisions based on
inadequate information. See Concept Release, supra note 22, at 23752 n.2.
73. Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1991). See also All-Holders and Best-Price
Release, supra note 57. In adopting the All-Holders Rule, the Commission stated that
the all-holders requirement would realize the disclosure purposes of the Williams Act
by ensuring that "all members of the class subject to the tender offer receive informa-
tion necessary to make an informed decision regarding the merits of the tender offer."
Id. at 25875. In addition, the Commission specifically pointed out that the language of
the Williams Act envisions tender offers for a "class" of equity security and that such
language reflects Congress' intent that all securityholders have the occasion to partici-
pate in the tender offer (emphasis added). Id. But cf Id. at 25877 (noting that the all-
holders requirement would not affect an international tender offer where the pur-
chaser was not a citizen of the United States and did not use the jurisdictional means,
thereby rendering the federal securities laws applicable to the transaction).
74. See 1985 Companies Act § 428. The United Kingdom compulsory acquisition
statutes require that the offer be made to all shareholders and the purchaser must ac-
quire 90 percent of the outstanding shares otherwise the purchaser must wait one year
before acquiring the remaining minority interest.
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cedure has developed in transactions in which foreign acquisitions of
non-U.S. corporations with insignificant U.S. shareholders have
avoided the application of the Williams Act for tender offers and the
Securities Act for exchange offers. For instance, Section 14(d) of the
Exchange Act75 prohibits a purchaser from making a tender offer "by
use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
otherwise" without compliance with Commission rules and regula-
tions. Section 5 of the Securities Act 76 prohibits a person from offer-
ing or selling securities if the activities make use of any means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and compliance has not
been made with the Securities Act's registration requirements.
Billions of dollars in international tender and exchange offers have
been structured in such a manner so as to avoid the use of the juris-
dictional means, especially when seeking to avoid application of the
above statutory provisions.77 In order to avoid the application of the
federal securities laws, bidder's in their offering circular generally
will specify that the offer is not being made in the United States; that
copies of the offering document are not being mailed or otherwise
distributed or sent into the United States; that envelopes containing
forms of acceptances should not be sent from the United States and
each securityholder must certify that they have not used the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce in receiving information or in
mailing the letter of transmittal back to the purchaser.
The restrictions imposed by many of these transactions raise a fun-
damental question of whether such restrictions are consistent with
the home country takeover law. For instance, the United Kingdom
and Canadian takeover law have requirements similar to the Com-
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
77. See Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elect. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986)
(bid by General Electric PLC, a British company, for the Plessey Company PLC, also a
British company); Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. v. Gulf Canada Corp., C.A. No. 86-
0780 (D.D.C. 1989) (acquisition of a controlling block of Hiram Walker, a Canadian cor-
poration, by Gulf Canada Corporation, also a Canadian corporation); Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989)
(bid by Minorco, S.A., a Luxembourg corporation, for Consolidated Gold Fields PLC, a
British company); Letter of Chairman David S. Ruder to Congressman Harold Rogers,
Sept. 6, 1989, Cong. Rec. (Sept. 7, 1989), S.10839 (explaining why the bid by Hoylake
Investments Limited, a Bermuda company, for B.A.T. Industries PLC, a British com-
pany did not fall within the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws); Williams Hold-
ings PLC recent unsuccessful exchange offer for all outstanding ordinary shares of
Racal Electronics PLC.
mission's All-Holders Rule.78 In addition, in the United Kingdom, a
bidder acquiring 90 percent of the shares of a target corporation may
only effect a second step compulsory acquisition if the original trans-
action was extended to all securityholders of the target corporation
and securityholders had the opportunity to receive the same consid-
eration.79 The Take-Over Panel in the United Kingdom, however,
has taken the position that even if a tender offer includes restrictions
on the manner in which the offer is made and the manner in which it
may be accepted, the Take-over Panel will view the offer as having
been extended to all securityholders.80 This is permitted even
though significant restrictions are included essentially barring U.S.
holders from participating in the offer. The offer is not considered
by U.K. and Canadian regulatory authorities as a violation of the ap-
plicable foreign country's takeover code. It seems anomalous, how-
ever, that such a clear departure from a significant precept of
fundamental fairness included in the United Kingdom and Canadian
rules is permitted, and has the blessing of the regulatory authority.
By placing significant restrictions on an offer, in essence, to have the
offer not made to all holders, since certain investors may not over-
come the restrictions imposed in order to participate in the transac-
tion, simply allows purchasers to avoid the intent of the statutory
scheme.
Avoiding a more burdensome jurisdiction (the United States in
most instances) usually is not satisfactory to a bidder or the securi-
tyholders excluded and is not conducive to cooperative regulation.
The securityholders excluded in these transactions generally know
nothing of the details of an offer or, because they may not participate
directly in the offer, even if they know of the offer, they will not re-
ceive the full offer price for their securities. In order to obtain any
benefit from an offer, securityholders must instead sell shares into
the marketplace, but incur a transaction cost which reduces the full
benefit of an offer. In either event, securityholders are making fun-
damental investment decisions about their securities on the basis of
inadequate information and without ready access to the bidder's of-
fering document. The bidder, on the other hand, can never be cer-
tain that it has successfully avoided the use of the jurisdictional
78. See THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, General Principle No. 1
(1910), 2 Fin. Serv. Rep. (CCH Ltd), B-1 at 140, 261 (General Principle No. 1 re-
quires that all shareholders of the same class be treated "similarly" by an offeror); ON-
TARIO SECURITIES ACT § 94(1) (a bid must be made to all holders of the same class of
target shares residing in the province); QUEBEC SECURITIEs ACT § 145 (same).
79. CITY CODE, supra note 74.
80. Brown & MacLachlan, supra note 70, at 78. See also Letter of Comment on
the Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers, 55 Fed. Reg. 23751,
from The Take-over Panel to Jonathan G. Katz, Commission File No. S7-10-90.
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means and the requirements to comply with that jurisdiction's take-
over scheme.
3. Case-by-case Accommodation-Modifications to the Legal
Requirements to Reconcile Differing Systems
A third approach to conflicting requirements involves careful
hand-tailored accommodations to differing legal requirements. Pur-
chaser's using this approach, work on a case-by-case basis with regu-
lators in the different countries to tailor accommodations to or seek
waivers from the conflicting requirements. This approach has
worked with certain transactions considered by the Commission and
the Take-over Panel in the United Kingdom on four occasions.8 1 In
addition, the Commission worked with counsel to a Swedish company
to structure a transaction so that it would comply with both U.S. and
Swedish regulatory schemes.8 2
This approach, however, has the disadvantage of unpredictability,
potential loss of confidentiality in the planning stages of the acquisi-
tion proposal, and the need for substantial interaction with the rele-
vant regulatory authorities and their staffs.8 3 Moreover, in a hostile
offer, such hand-tailored accommodations have not been tested and
may prove unworkable.
The case-by-case hand-tailored accommodations have been most
81. See In the Matter of Ford Motor Company, PLC, Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 27425 (November 2, 1989) (cash offer by Ford for shares of Jaguar PLC-two
offers were made, one to U.S. residents and one to all other shareholders); Letter re-
garding Manpower PLC and Manpower Inc., (February 15, 1991) (an exchange offer by
a newly formed U.S. company for all the shares of a company chartered in the United
Kingdom in order to change the domicile of the parent company. Approximately 75
percent of Manpower PLC's ordinary shares were held in the United States and most
of its executive offices and operations were in the United States, thus disqualifying the
target from the status of a foreign private issuer. In the transaction, a single offer was
extended to both U.S. and U.K. holders) In re Hanson PLC, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 29835 (October 18, 1991) (an exchange offer by a U.K. company for the
shares of a U.K. company with significant U.S. securityholders. The Commission
granted relief from 14d-10 which allowed Hanson not to extend an alternative form of
consideration. In addition, a single offering document was used in both countries);
Letter regarding Blockbuster Entertainment Corporation (December 20, 1991) (cash
and exchange offer by U.S. company for all ordinary shares of a U.K. company).
82. See In the Matter of Aktiebolaget Volvo and Procordia Aktiebolag, Securities
Exchange Act No. 27671 (February 2, 1990) (exchange and cash offers of Aktiebolaget
Volvo, a Swedish company with shares traded on the National Association of Security
Dealers Automated Quotation system, and Procordia Aktiebolag, a company controlled
by the Swedish government, for all shares of another Swedish company, Pharmacia
Aktiebolag, a Swedish company reporting in the U.S. and affiliated with Volvo).
83. Brown & MacLachlan, supra note 70, at 60.
successful in friendly acquisitions (i.e., Ford/Jaguar, Manpower, Han-
son/Beazer, Blockbuster/Citivision and Volvo/Procordia) and where
the regulatory scheme applicable to the target corporation prevents
the target corporation from creating impediments to the transaction
(i.e., Ford/Jaguar).8 4 Where this approach was used in a hostile
transaction, the Hoylake Investments Ltd. offer for B.A.T. Industries,
the Take-Over Panel did grant relief from a City Code provision reg-
ulating the number of days a bid may remain open before it lapses.
Ordinarily under the City Code, if a bid does not become wholly un-
conditional twenty-one days after its posting, a takeover bid lapses,
and may not be renewed for one year.85 The Take-Over Panel
granted an exemption in Hoylake because the obtaining of a required
approval from nine U.S. state insurance regulators would have taken
months.
4. Deferral to another Regulatory Authority
The last approach to facilitate international tender and exchange
offers, and one that is being explored by a number of regulators, is
for a bidder to seek the deferral by those regulatory authorities with
relatively little connection to the transaction in favor of the regula-
tory authority of the target corporation or the regulatory authority
with the closest nexus to the transaction. This is the approach that
most commentators believe should be taken.86
Such an approach may have several advantages, such as predict-
ability, no hand-tailored case-by-case relief required and a greater
likelihood that offers will be extended to all holders. If a bidder can
rely on the jurisdiction of the target corporation, a bidder can comply
with the appropriate regulatory scheme in advance. In addition, a
bidder's concern that the confidentiality of the acquisition will be
breached is alleviated if only one regulator supervises the transac-
tion. Moreover, regulatory authorities can avoid large staff commit-
ments in attempting to accommodate differing legal systems on a
case-by-case basis. Last, and most important, is the belief that inter-
national tender and exchange offers can be extended to U.S. holders
if the Williams Act and the Securities Act do not apply to the trans-
84. Because U.S. residents held more than 25 percent of the Jaguar securities, the
success of the transaction, and the ability to accomplish a compulsory acquisition at the
conclusion of the takeover in the United Kingdom, would have been extremely diffi-
cult without the inclusion of U.S. securityholders in the transaction, thereby necessi-
tating accommodations. See also In re Hanson PLC, supra note 81.
85. City Code Rules 31.6, 35.1 (1990) 2 Fin. Serv. Rep. (CCH Ltd.) M-4 at 140,
904 N-1 at 140, 981.
86. Brown & MacLachlan, supra note 70, at 60; Greene, Regulation of Multina-
tional Tender Offers, 4 INSIGHTS 25 (December 1990); Extraterritorial Application of
Securities Regulation, supra note 25; Demott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover
Regulation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 69 (1987).
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action. If the Williams Act and the Securities Act are not applicable,
a foreign bidder's concern over the Williams Act's tender offer rules
and regulations, the Securities Act's registration requirements, or the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and the civil liability provi-
sions of the Securities Act will be alleviated. Foreign purchaser's
have shown tremendous reluctance to incur the expense and trouble
of complying with U.S. regulation when confronted with the impact
of the antifraud provisions and the liability provisions of the federal
securities laws.
IV. COMMISSION INITIATIVES
Since the late 1980s the Commission has made a concerted effort to
address the globalization and integration of the financial markets
taking place around the world. The Commission through its rule
making authority has attempted to accommodate the various interna-
tional policy issues that have arisen as the world's securities markets
have become interdependent.8 7 Inasmuch as complete cooperative
regulation may be a long term goal, requiring a long period of transi-
tion by the international regulatory community, more immediate
measures should be considered which resolve current problems and
point in the direction of cooperative regulation and the harmoniza-
tion of the various methods of regulating securities markets. The
Commission in the 1990s has taken small strides to cooperative regu-
lation and a more territorial approach to the application of the fed-
eral securities laws.
A. Rule 144A and Regulation S
The Commission in April 1990, after a two year process, adopted
Rule 144A and Regulation S.88 Rule 144A liberalized the regulations
governing the private placement market by creating a safe harbor for
the resale of certain securities. Regulation S, on the other hand, gov-
erns the distribution of corporate securities that are issued overseas
without requiring registration in the United States.
Rule 144A establishes an exemption from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act for resales to certain "qualified institu-
tional buyers" (QIBs) of securities that at the time of issuance were
not "fungible" with a class of securities publicly traded in the United
States. One of the principal effects of Rule 144A was to increase the
87. See supra notes 22 and 49.
88. Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17933; Regulation S Adopting Release, supra note 49.
liquidity of the secondary market in the United States for eligible se-
curities that are not publicly registered with the Commission. Prior
to the expiration of the Rule 144 holding period,8 9 resales of most pri-
vately placed securities could only be made in further private place-
ments, which frequently involved investment representations,
legended securities and opinions of counsel. Resales of securities
among QIBs that satisfy the rules's conditions will now be free of
these types of restrictions and will benefit from the certainty of the
safe harbor exemption.
Increased access to the U.S. secondary markets also should result
since qualified securities initially offered by issuers (whether domes-
tic or foreign) in offshore transactions that are not subject to the re-
gistration requirements of the Securities Act, including transactions
using Regulation S to which the registration requirements do not ap-
ply, could be resold immediately to QIBs in the United States in reli-
ance on Rule 144A.
One of the primary effects of the rule has been the expansion of
the United States capital markets to the debt and equity securities of
non-U.S. corporations. This liberalization of the United States pri-
vate placement market is, in fact, a reflection and confirmation of
certain significant trends that have transformed this market from a
small, illiquid, and conservative source of capital at the beginning of
the 1980s to an extremely large, more liquid, and increasingly inter-
national capital market in the 1990s.90
Regulation S consists of preliminary notes and new rules under the
Securities Act and supersedes the Commission's prior release on the
territoriality of the Securities Act9l and related no-action and inter-
pretive letters. Regulation S includes two non-exclusive safe harbor
provisions under which transactions meeting all of the applicable
conditions will be deemed to occur outside the United States and,
therefore, will not be subject to the registration requirements of Sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act.
The issuer safe harbor92 applies to offers and sales by issuers, dis-
tributors, their respective affiliates and persons acting on their be-
half. The resale safe harbor9 3 applies to resales by persons other
than the issuer, a distributor, their respective affiliates, and persons
acting on their behalf.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1991).
90. Chu, The US. Private Market for Foreign Securities, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE,
at 55, Jan./Feb. 1991.
91. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Under.
writers of Foreign Offerings as Broker.Dealers, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964); Securities Act
Release No. 4708 (avail. July 9, 1964).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (1991).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 230.904 (1991).
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Regulation S addresses only the applicability of the registration re-
quirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. The regulation does
not affect the application of the antifraud rules or other provisions of
the federal securities laws.94
As a result of Rule 144A and Regulation S, it is now relatively sim-
ple for non-U.S. companies to launch equity offerings targeted at U.S.
institutional investors, thus providing the foreign firms with a readily
available U.S. source of equity financing. Moreover, foreign issuers
can also target a private U.S. tranche of equity in an international eq-
uity offering. Equity offerings can be made on a multitranche basis,
with an offering in the United States and offerings in the
Euromarket and in the issuer's domestic market. This offering strat-
egy enables the issuer to market securities to a much larger investor
universe.
B. Multijurisdictional Disclosure System with Canada
Another example of cooperative regulation is the recent adoption
of the MJDS with Canada which attempts, among other things, to
harmonize minimum disclosure and procedural requirements for si-
multaneous multinational securities offerings, tender and exchange
offers, and business combinations in the United States and Canada.95
In adopting the MJDS, the Commission took a significant step in the
regulation of international transactions in that the MJDS permits a
Canadian corporation to use the disclosure and offering documents
adopted by the Canadian authorities for compliance with the Wil-
liams Act and the Commission's tender offer regulation. This step is
unprecedented in the Commission's history, since, except for the for-
eign integrated disclosure system, the Commission has always man-
dated that issuers comply with the federal securities laws. With the
adoption of the MJDS with Canada, however, the Commission
adopted Canadian rules and regulations as their own.
C. International Tender and Exchange Offer Release
More specifically for international tender and exchange offers, the
Commission on June 5, 1991 published for comment proposed rules,
forms and a proposed exemptive order that would permit tender of-
fers for a foreign issuer's securities to proceed in the U.S. on the basis
of the applicable regulation of the target company's home jurisdic-
94. Regulation S Proposing Release, supra note 49, at 22662.
95. MJDS Release, supra note 22.
tion, where a small percentage of the shares sought are held by U.S.
holders.96 The rules, forms and exemptive order permit single-juris-
diction regulation with respect to both the tender offer and registra-
tion requirements, so that multijurisdictional cash tender offers,
exchange offers and business combinations may be made more effi-
ciently and at less expense.
The International Tender Offer Release suggests that the Commis-
sion is very concerned with adopting an approach that would permit
international tender and exchange offers to proceed without the ex-
clusion of U.S. shareholders. The most troublesome aspect of the In-
ternational Tender Offer Release, though, is the extent to which the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act apply to a transaction gov-
erned by the laws of another jurisdiction.97 As presently set forth in
the proposal, the antifraud provisions would apply, much as they con-
tinue to apply to any transaction that relies on Regulation S. Foreign
purchasers may well continue to avoid extending offers into the
United States because of concerns about the U.S. antifraud provi-
sions, rather than concerns about certain line item disclosure require-
ments, of which there will be none if the proposed rules and forms
are adopted.
V. CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
The two most often cited reasons for excluding U.S. investors in in-
ternational tender and exchange offers is the general antifraud provi-
sions and the civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws.98
The Commission, through the above initiatives, has attempted to re-
duce foreign corporations apprehension over the applicability of the
civil liability provisions by permitting the sale of securities offshore
through Regulation S; by allowing for the resale of securities through
the use of private placements with the adoption of Rule 144A; and by
permitting securities to be registered and tender or exchange offers
to be made by use of the home country disclosure document of the
target corporation.
The Commission appears to recognize that subjecting an exchange
96. International Tender Offer Release, supra note 9.
97. See Letters of Comment on the Concept Release from the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Sullivan & Cromwell, The Take-over Panel and the City of London Law Soci-
ety, among others, to Jonathan G. Katz, Commission File No. S7-10-90; and Letters of
Comment on the International Tender Offer Release, from the American Bar Associa-
tion, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Sullivan & Cromwell, the City of London Law Soci-
ety and The Take-over Panel, among others, to Jonathan G. Katz, Commission File
No. S7-18-91.
98. Sections 11 and 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2)
and 77q(a) (1988)]; Sections 10(b), 15(c)(1) and 18 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1) and 78r (1988)] and Rules 10b-5 and 15cl-2 [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5
and 240.15cl-2 (1988)] thereunder.
[Vol. 19: 939, 1992] International Tender and Exchange Offers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
offer to the express civil liability provisions under the Securities Act
may expose a foreign bidder or issuer to liability that is stricter than
that which is prescribed in the bidder's home country, thereby creat-
ing a deterrent to registering exchange offers with the Commission.99
However, the Commission appears to continue to believe that the an-
tifraud provisions of the Williams Act are broader in scope then the
tender offer provisions. 0 0 Even if U.S. residents had purchased in-
significant amounts of the foreign target corporation's stock that is
the subject of an international tender offer, subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over such a transaction may exist under the Williams Act if the
international tender offer involves fraud, deception or manipulative
acts. 10 1 Since fraud is universally proscribed and the Commission's
antifraud provisions were conceived to enforce fundamental notions
of honesty, the Commission appears to believe that this same impedi-
ment should not accrue with respect to the general antifraud provi-
sions that would be applicable to an international cash tender
offer.102
This position of the Commission's appears predicated on a belief, as
noted by the court in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco,
S.A.,103 that "the antifraud provisions of American securities laws
have broader extraterritorial reach than American filing require-
ments."'104 In Consolidated Gold Fields, 05 the Commission urged the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to overturn the district
court's dismissal of the target's securities fraud claims. The Commis-
sion, on the other hand, argued that a U.S. court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over such claims where the bidder, by delivering alleg-
edly fraudulent tender offer materials to the recordholders of stock
beneficially owned by U.S. residents, could foresee that the allegedly
99. Concept Release, supra note 22, at 23752; International Tender Offer Release,
supra note 9, at 27583.
100. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Consol-
idated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Brief
of the S.E.C.].
101. Id.
102. For instance, in the United Kingdom Section 422 of the Financial Services Act
of 1986 provides that the circulation of offer documents relating to multinational
tender offers may under certain circumstances give rise to liability for untrue or mis-
leading statements.
103. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
104. Id at 262, citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.
1975). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 416 comment a, reporters note 2 (1987) ("[A]n
interest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is entitled to greater weight
than are routine administrative requirements.").
105. Id
false statements would have an effect in the United States. In revers-
ing the district court's dismissal of the target corporation's securities
claims (while upholding the lower court's grant of a preliminary in-
junction on antitrust grounds), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit agreed with the Commission that the transmittal by the nom-
inees was a direct and foreseeable result of the bidder's extraterrito-
rial conduct, and therefore gave rise to the requisite "effects"
necessary to support jurisdiction by a U.S. court. The Second Circuit,
though, declined the Commission's suggestion that it abstain from is-
suing a world-wide remedy on the basis of principles of comity for
the securities law violations, due to what the court discerned as an
inadequate record, and remanded the antifraud claims for further
fact-finding by the district court on the abstention issue.106
In an earlier case, also decided by the Second Circuit, liT v.
Cornfeld,107 the court stated that a foreign country should not be of-
fended by the assertion of jurisdiction related to the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws since "[t]he problem of conflict
between our laws and that of a foreign government is much less
when the issue is the enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the
securities laws than with such provisions as those requiring registra-
tion of persons or securities."108 Moreover, the Second Circuit partic-
ularly noted in lIT v. Cornfeld, that the United States would find it
troubling if foreign courts "stood silently and permitted misrepre-
sented securities to be poured into the United States" especially
when the securities in question were those of "the pourer's own na-
tionals."10 9 Generally then, United States jurisdiction is more likely
to be applied in a case that involves enforcement of the antifraud
provisions than provisions relating to the registration of securities or
broker-dealers.10 On the other hand, an international tender or ex-
change offer that involves some conduct in the United States, but
lacks fraudulent conduct, is less likely to be subject to the require-
ments of the federal securities laws."'1
As noted earlier, the courts have taken several approaches in ap-
plying the jurisdictional tests to actions concerning conduct that is
minimally a part of securities violations perpetrated primarily
abroad. The result seems to be that, depending on which circuit the
action happens to lie, any significant domestic activity, no matter how
106. 871 F.2d at 262.
107. 619 F.2d at 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 921.
109. Id. at 920.
110. Goelzer, supra note 44 at 619; accord Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co.,
PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 494 (D. Del. 1986).
111. See Note, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws in the Ab-
sence of Fraud Charges, 18 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 649, 655-64 (1986).
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remotely connected to the primary transaction, can provide the basis
for U.S. jurisdiction over the domestic actor if the conduct furthers a
fraudulent scheme.112 Furthermore, simply because an offer ex-
tended into the United States will be subject to the general antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws does not necessarily presup-
pose that a court will automatically look to U.S. law in deciding the
controversy. 1 3 For instance, the Commission recently emphasized in
connection with the adoption of the MJDS, and in issuing for com-
ment the International Tender and Exchange Offer Release and the
Cross-border Rights Offering Release"i4 its belief that a registration
statement, rights offering or tender offer that is prepared in accord-
ance with foreign requirements or practice, but accepted pursuant to
the new disclosure system or one of the other proposed rules, would
not be considered misleading simply because the information re-
quired by a different Commission form or schedule is omitted.1i i By
permitting transactions to proceed on the basis of the foreign country
disclosure documents, rules and practices, the Commission, in effect,
adopts those requirements as its own. Moreover, the court stated in
Consolidated Gold Fields, plc v. Minorco, S.A., that "[i]t is a settled
principle of international and our domestic law that a court may ab-
stain from exercising enforcement jurisdiction when the extraterrito-
rial effect of a paiticular remedy is so disproportionate to harm
within the United States as to offend principles of comity."" 16
Assuming that the Commission and the courts are correct in their
belief that the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions are
broader in scope than the filing or registration requirements, the
question then becomes whether the Commission can and should
carve out certain transactions in order to permit those transactions to
proceed in the United States subject only to the rules and regulations
of a foreign country. Since the antifraud provisions are embodied in
the statutory sections of the federal securities laws, the United States
Congress would have to amend the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act to permit such transactions to occur without being subject to the
antifraud and civil liability provisions.117 Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of
112. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, at 30-31; Tamari v. Bache & Co.
(Lebanon) S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D.Ill. 1982); and Plessey Co. PLC v. General
Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D.Del. 1986).
113. See Brief of the S.E.C., supra note 101.
114. See supra note 22.
115. Id.
116. 871 F. 2d at 263.
117. See supra note 99.
the Exchange Act 1i8 grant to the Commission the authority to "de-
fine, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Without
express statutory authority, the Commission rule making authority
appears limited to those actions that have been granted by Congress.
In this instance, Congress has granted limited authority to the Com-
mission to define only fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, not to exempt specific transactions from these provisions.
Congress itself, on the other hand, has had numerous opportunities
to address the issue of the extraterritoriality of the federal securities
laws and, specifically the broad reach of the antifraud provisions,"19
and has so far taken no action to restrict the Commission's jurisdic-
tional reach or overrule the various courts interpretation of the
broad reach of the antifraud provisions. In addition, with the scan-
dals that have plagued not only the United States but other foreign
markets, going to the integrity of those markets, Congress will proba-
bly be disinclined to do so.
The question then arises whether the retention of the antifraud
provisions will serve to inhibit foreign bidders from including U.S.
securityholders in foreign transactions, and whether for policy rea-
sons the Commission should assert some influence on the U. S. Con-
gress to permit certain foreign transactions to occur while rendering
the antifraud provisions inapplicable to those provisions. The Com-
mission, though, should not assert any influence in this area, since
U.S. antifraud provisions should not deter foreign bidders and issu-
ers. These provisions are merely intended to impose on such parties
an obligation to conduct an honest, forthright transaction. All inter-
national regulatory systems should reasonably be expected to provide
a minimum amount of protection against fraud and other unfair prac-
tices, if only to promote reliance on statements made by issuers of
and traders in securities. Moreover, while fraudulent and manipula-
tive conduct can give rise to litigation, the plaintiff must proffer suffi-
cient conduct in violation of the antifraud provisions in order to be
successful in its suit. Since it is easier to initiate litigation alleging
material misstatements or non-disclosure, or violations of procedural
rules than it is to show facts supporting manipulative behavior and
thus violations of the Commission's antifraud provisions, frivolous or
merely obstructive litigation in this area should be dealt with by the
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j and 78n(e) (1988).
119. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING AND SECURI-
TIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1988) and HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PROBLEMS WITH THE SEC's EN-
FORCEMENT OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS IN CASES INVOLVING SUSPICIOUS TRADES
ORIGINATING FROM ABROAD, H.R. REP. No. 1065, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
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courts who have full power to dismiss such actions and sanction the
offending participants.
V. CONCLUSION
As this article demonstrates, corporations and their shareholders
have become international in character during the 1980s and coun-
tries vary widely, not only in their requirements as to takeovers but
also in their application of their takeover requirements to offers for
target corporations incorporated in another jurisdiction. Some regu-
lators take the view that investors from their country need the same
protection they would be entitled to had the offer been made entirely
in that country-the American Viewpoint. Other regulators consider
that if investors from their country have determined to make invest-
ments in a corporation located outside their territorial boundaries,
those securityholders should be prepared to be governed by the rules
and regulations of the country of incorporation-the European
Viewpoint.
Until there is greater international harmonization of policies, inter-
national tender and exchange offers will continue to be a legal
nightmare for purchasers, but a rich source of employment for inter-
national corporate lawyers.
The recent initiatives by the Commission, the Take-over Panel and
the Canadian authorities have been helpful in solving the regulatory
conflicts caused by an international tender or exchange offer, but
they are first steps in what will surely be a long process. The Com-
mission is reticent to accept the European Viewpoint towards inter-
national tender and exchange offers because of significant policy and
statutory constraints. However, as the Commission gains further
knowledge and understanding that the rules and regulations pro-
vided by these foreign countries are sufficient to afford all securi-
tyholders certain minimal protection, these policy and statutory
constraints may well begin to fall.

